Judging GOFOs

Americans like to rank things. From Dave Letterman’s nightly Top 10 list, to college football’s weekly rankings, America is fascinated with rankings. Listen to talk radio on the way to work, and you may hear an argument on whether Tom Brady or Joe Montana is the greatest quarterback of all time. Nearly every year a list of the greatest presidents will appear. Political partisans are quick to point out how a current President is either the best or the worst president in history, through many of these arguments seem devoid of any historical context.

Only recently have those in the defense and military complex begun to look at how we rate generals. Tom Ricks, on his “Best Defense” blog has discussed the top 10 worst generals in U.S. history.[i] However, the list is subjective, and open to debate, as top 10 lists tend to be. As military professionals, we should think about more objective ways to rate generals and determine their relative success. To do so demands development of objective criteria.

Historical writings on general officers focus on key attributes such as leadership, ethics, or tactical and strategic competence.  The shortcoming in this analysis is the overwhelming number of general officers will not lead large masses of forces in combat. The large body of work of U.S. Army general officers occurs outside of command, and often at the institutional level. Judgment on the success or failure occurs in this framework.

Literature Review

Multiple authors over the past century tackled the complex issue of generalship. Writings span the range detailing success and failures of the military’s highest leaders. Books that discuss the subject include Rick Atkinson’s The Liberation Trilogy, which includes An Army at Dawn.  Further, there is H.R. McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty, Tom Rick’s The Generals, J.F.C. Fuller’s Generalship, and Karl Von Clausewitz, who discusses attributes of great generals in his seminal book On War.

The books discussed above center around two notions. First, success in combat. Second, the attributes required of military flag officers. H.R. McMaster’s seminal book Dereliction of Duty centers on the failures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff throughout the Vietnam War. Their respective failure occurred through a lack of intestinal fortitude to speak truth to power on events in Vietnam. As ineffective leaders, President Johnson ignored their weak advice on the use of military power. Although an excellent book on the details of strategic failure, a focus on the 4-Star leadership of the U.S. military ignores the overwhelming number of general officers at the 1-3 star level, often working institutional issues of manning, equipping, and training the force that fought in Vietnam.

J.F.C. Fuller wrote on the attributes or competencies required of general officers. Specifically, Fuller detailed how generals must consistently serve on the front line with their troops.[ii] Displays of physical courage, according to Fuller are essential to successful general officer leadership.

Both Tom Ricks and Rick Atkinson discuss in high detail the success and failures of general officers in Iraq and World War II respectively. For Ricks, the success of flag officers ultimately comes down to performance in combat. However, an important aspect of Rick’s work is the detailed discussions of General George Marshal. Not only was Marshal instrumental in his work to prepare and maintain an Army at War, his paramount contribution came in the selection of the Army’s combat leaders. Indeed, proper talent management of the general officer corps had as much to do with victory in World War II as did the operational planning and execution of field commanders.

Continuing with the attributes of flag officers, Karl Von Clause wiz, in his  book On War, describes the military genius required of those who hold the higher rank. Clausewitz describes the trait known as Coup d’ oeil as “an inward eye,” or the ability of commanders to instantly recognize, decide, and act on a situation in battle.[iii]  Further, Clausewitz informs his readers that generals should consistently refine their respective intellect, as in an environment defined by fog, friction, and chance, discriminating judgement is paramount.

Moral character

A display of high morals and ethics is the minimum standard for both the officer corps and the general officer corps. As the minimum, general officers should not be graded on their personal conduct. Proper morals and ethics is a pass/fail exam. Similar to the Chris Rock comedy routine, there are some things in life you don’t get credit for. General Officers (all officers really), do not receive credit for not being drunk on duty. Nor do general officers receive credit for not cheating on their spouses, or sleeping with subordinates. Further, general officers do not get credit for submitting accurate travel vouchers. The failings of General Sinclair and General Ward serve as a reminder, that improper conduct from the most senior military leaders leave a stain on the military as a

Other characteristics or desired qualities of general officers apply in how we expect the military’s most senior officers to serve still apply. J.F. C. Fuller wrote about the desire for general officers to talk to and serve with front-line soldiers. Further, physical and moral courage remain paramount in what we expect of general officers. Traits and characteristics however, fall short in the judgement on the effectiveness of generals and admirals in today’s complex world.

Long Lasting Impact

On the operation side, the judgement of generals often comes down to the outcome of the war. Indeed, General Officers of the WWII generation are often regarded as heroes, regardless of detailed analysis of their respective conduct. General officers of the Vietnam era re often grouped and labeled failures, despite the varying degrees of performance. However, not every general gets to command large organizations in combat. As such, their impact is observed within military institutions.

General officers should be leading the military in change. At the end of a career, general officers should examine their body of work both in the intellectual and physical aspects. Intellectually, general officers should be writing to publish and advance their ideas that they have developed over the course of a 25-40 year career. Publishing what one thinks, prior to retirement is paramount to inviting discussion, innovation, and change.

Physical change occurs in how well general officers physically change the Army. A profound example of success is Huba Wass de Czege’s implementation of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth. Indeed, the SAMS program has been paramount in building and sustaining the intellectual capacity of the Army for over a generation. Further, many credit the SAMS program for producing the “Jedi Knights” who created the operational plans for the first Gulf War.

Other examples of a long lasting policy impact upon the services includes those who developed AirLand Battle, and the implementation of the combat training centers. General officers who led the development and implementation of AirLand Battle such as William DePuy are an easy target to paint for success. Another example of a strategic thinker whose impact went well beyond his tenure of service is Admiral J.C. Wylie who conceptualized a theory of control. Juxtaposed against the success of these flag officers are those who advocated for the implementation of Effects Based Operations (EBO). Indeed, the development of long-lasting doctrine tested in battle is a high water mark of successful flag level officers.

The implementation of training facilities such as the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) ensured that the U.S. Army could rapidly adjust to combat conditions when the time came. Again, the development of JRTC and NTC proved to be decisive in the U.S. victory over the Iraqi Army in both the Gulf War and major combat operations in Iraq in 2003. Today, the Army uses the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) to prepare soldiers

Future Combat Systems (FCS) quickly earned the moniker Failed Combat Systems. For nearly a decade, the United States Army spent inordinate amounts of money on combat platforms and systems that would prove to be both irrelevant and unnecessary. Successful material solutions in recent history include big-ticket items such as Patriot Missiles and the M1 tank, both of which are part of the famed “Big 5.”  These and other modern day systems such as Blue force Tracker should be used as a marker for judging the success or failure of general officers.          

Civilian-Military Relationship

Two general officers, despite battlefield success are generally viewed upon as failures at the end of their respective careers. General MacArthur nearly destroyed the civilian-military relationship with his personal conduct during the Korean War. In a similar vain, General Stan McCrystal, for all his battlefield brilliance as the commander of JSOC, was relieved of command for violating the trust of our civilian masters. The ability for general officers to maintain the proper relationship between the military, the executive, and the legislative branches of government is paramount.

General Officers are often called to testify before congress to justify force structure and the acquisition of critical capabilities of the force. The capacity to justify and get congress on board with recommended force structure is paramount to the success of general officers. If the elected leaders of the United States do not believe what you are telling them, or impressing upon them to do, then a general’s tenure in office cannot be judged as a success. A recent example is General Odierno, who often went to congress with the intent of maintaining a 490k man active force, only to have QDRs, and NDAAs written for a smaller force structure reduced to 450.

The 20/20 hindsight consensus is General Eric Shinseki was correct when he testified to congress that the United States would need overwhelming numbers of troops in Iraq to secure the population following major combat operations (although the author remains unconvinced on this point). However, being right is not the equivalent of success. Success in this aspect would have been to convince Congress and the Secretary of Defense of the necessity of said combat forces. We should rate generals on the quality of the force after they retire.

Talent Management

General Marshall is the obvious example of a General Officer who identified and groomed talent leading up and through World War II. As directors on service and combatant command staffs, the onus is on general officers to ensure that field grade level talent is maximized throughout the officer corps. In the confines of each successive assignment. Ultimately, flag officers choose the next cohort of flag officers. The failure of generals and admirals either in combat or in their respective institutional performance is both a judgement on the individual officer, and those that selected the individual for senior leadership. Looking back Fox Conner’s greatest success was General Marshall, and in turn, one of his highest marks of success was General Eisenhower. We should rate generals based on the performance of their follow-on generation of general officers.

Mentoring the Next Generation  

General officers should continue to provide mentorship to those they rate and senior rate. This is paramount in the development and success of Field Grade Officers and the senior NCO Corps. However, individual counseling works best at the tactical level. At the operational and strategic level, general officers have the opportunity to provide a vision of the future force and share their wisdom through writing and publication.

More than personal mentorship, those holding flag officer rank need to write and publish their thoughts and ideas.  If the general officer corps is the PhD level of the military, subsequently, each officer wearing a star on their uniform should be contributing to the military filed of knowledge. This wisdom should be shared through commander’s blogs, publications in professional journals, and speaking engagements at various professional military education (PME) schools, to include Captains Courses, CGSC, ACSC and the various War Colleges. Further, our senior leadership should engage enlisted PME at every opportunity. We should rate generals on the body of thought they leave to future generations.

Conclusion

The success or failure of systems, policies, and influence is not a judgement on the totality of a career. Indeed, those that fail to implement a successful program can point to overarching achievements over two to four years, and in the case of flag officers twenty five years plus of dedicated service to the nation. Outside of moral and ethical failings, a judgement on the performance of the flag officer corps should in no way be viewed as a judgement on character.    

[i] Thomas Ricks. http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/06/02/the-worst-general-in-american-history-2/

[ii] J.F.C. Fuller Generalship; Its Diseases and Their Cure.

[iii] Karl Von Clausewitz. On War. 

Thoughts on Air Superiority

There are a few things Soldiers desire in combat. Hot chow, quality leadership, and looking up to the sky with confidence that the aircraft above are friendly. Indeed, not since the Korean War has an enemy aircraft launched a successful attack on American ground forces. Brigidear General Alex “Grynch” Grynkewich published a series describing the fight for air superiority in 2030, and the capabilities the Air Force requires to ensure the United States can achieve air superiority when and where it’s needed.

In terms of joint force contributions to air superiority. The Army will have a role to support the Air Force in the air superiority mission. Capabilities and platforms such as the next generation of Patriots and THAAD are essential to the defense of air bases that the Air Force launches from. As enemies and adversaries acquire longer-range fires, the ability to protect airfields from distanced adversaries will be necessary. Moreover, although air defense missile capabilities have a history of shooting down enemy missiles, they are still effective at destroying enemy aircraft.  

In addition to air defense platforms, the army can provide a combination of ISR through the use of special operations forces. Indeed, Special Forces cannot only identify enemy air defense targets for destruction; they can provide the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC) with accurate battle damage assessments. Moreover, Special Forces working with local populations and indigenous forces can influence a wide range of enemy platforms prior to the introduction of friendly aircraft into a Joint Operations Area (JOA).  The use of Special Forces does not occur in a bubble, they must accompany a wide range of options to defeat enemy and adversary A2AD threats.

Complementing the use of Special Forces are joint force information operations capabilities. These capabilities range from Military Information Support Operations (MISO) to public affairs to key leader engagements and can be critical for the suppression of enemy air defense systems. For example, in terms of MISO, the ability to message enemy ADA platform operators or enemy pilots prior to takeoff can reduce the risk to U.S. platforms. Should enemy pilots understand that take-off in their respective aircraft will translate to death; they tend to think twice before engaging. Indeed, examples are plentiful in both Iraq Wars of Iraqi Pilots flying aircraft to adjacent nations to avoid destruction by the U.S. and other coalition air forces. MISO, however is not the only Information Operations related capability that the joint force can leverage to attain air superiority.

A successful key leader engagement plan executed prior to and throughout a conflict is paramount to overcoming anti-access efforts by adversaries. While U.S. diplomats engage political leaders for access to other nation’s air bases and support facilities, Joint leaders must engage their counterparts to ensure a rapid execution. The ability to seamlessly flow aircraft into a newly opened airfield that is set for operations allows the joint force to gain and maintain the initiative in the air. Unnecessary delays

General Grynkewich effectively communicates the necessity of cyberspace. Each service provides capabilities to ensure success in the cyberspace domain. However, although the Air Force will certainly focus its efforts on the Air Superiority mission, both the Army and Air Force will be well served to develop multi-service  or joint concepts on how cyberspace operations will contribute to Air Superiority. Indeed, each service has a stake in the attainment of air superiority, and should contribute to the mission in the shared domains of space and cyberspace.

Where I think General Grynkewich’s analysis could use more development is in the development of human capital. His discussion on innovation in “how the Air Force has traditionally developed and fielded systems” can certainly apply to the entirety of the joint force. However, this consideration must move beyond material solutions in the DOTMLPF paradigm. Indeed, General Grynkewich’s articles describe the platforms necessary to attain air superiority and do mention the need to adjust tactics and training. However, all services must consider how we develop the people who will operate these platforms. These include pilots, programmers working in the cyberspace domain, analysts evaluating intelligence, and Special Forces operators, to name just a few. As enemies and adversaries continue to advance and disseminate near-peer technology, America’s asymmetric advantage and ability to achieve air superiority will be in the form of human capital.  

In addition to human capital, it is germane to discuss other joint force contributions to air superiority in the future. Further, attaining air superiority requires the investment of time and effort of non-military entities, specifically diplomacy to ensure friendly airplanes fly over the heads of America’s ground forces. General Grynkewich takes careful time to discuss third-offset material capabilities; however, when the joint force considers how to attain air superiority in contingencies, interaction with civilians in the department of state is paramount. Since the end of World War II, the United States has developed a global presence with land, air, and maritime capabilities spread across the globe. Should conflict occur, use of these bases to launch aircraft (strike, ISR, Air to Air Refueling) is paramount. Indeed, Air Superiority will depend on the whole of government to overcome the anti-access fight through sustained engagement in peacetime, and in the build-up to conflicts.

Successful diplomacy to achieve air superiority is also necessary in the battle for legitimacy of U.S. operations. Enemies and adversaries will take their arguments to organizations such as the United Nations to delay or prevent the deployment and employment of U.S. power (to include air, maritime, and land forces). These delays can allow enemies to achieve a marked advantage by reducing the U.S. militaries initiative. Further, successful action through international organizations can prevent the U.S. from using select basing options necessary to attain air superiority.

The "D" in Elements of National Power

Air superiority is not America’s birthright. Enemies and adversaries will continue to seek symmetric and asymmetric advantages to overcome American power projection. Near peer adversaries will continue to develop aircraft and ADA platforms that can engage America’s latest generation of fighter aircraft. Moreover, nations will move in parallel on diplomatic fronts to ensure the United States cannot attain access to friendly or partner nation facilities during times of conflict. The Department of Defense and all services must look at their respective capabilities and determine how they will contribute to the air superiority mission.   

By the Numb3rs

Over time Westmoreland asked for and received large numbers of U.S. troops, eventually totaling well over half a million…  

…Westmoreland’s first resort in claiming progress in the war was always body count, but in fact this was meaningless. All the enemy’s losses were quickly made up. Westmoreland was on a treadmill. 

Lewis Sorely

                Over the course of a military career, nothing will take up more time than counting. Counting people and counting things starts from a private’s first day in service and continues to the final day of a 4-star general’s career. This obsession with counting and numbers occurs in operational and institutional commands. Failing to count properly can end a promising career. To explain this obsession with number, I break down the many (although not all) ways in which those in a uniform count

Keeping an accurate count starts early in a career at the individual level. For example, knowing your pace count is essential to pass land navigation courses. Unfortunately, land navigation tends to occur in rough and dense terrain, making a pace count irrelevant. Individuals must continually count and maintain accountability of sensitive items, from weapons and ammunition to night vision devices. Indeed, this counting is paramount to any soldier looking to avoid non-judicial punishment and hence have any shot at a career.  Indeed, at the U.S. Army’s Ranger School, students tie each piece of equipment to themselves, so when they are tired, cold, or wet, they do not lose a key piece of equipment. It has been written, that losing equipment can have greater consequences than losing a war.

 Counting people lies at the heart of the NCO Corps. Accountability of teams, squads and platoons. While on patrol, squad leaders and platoon sergeants consistently conduct head counts to ensure nobody fell asleep next to a tree. In garrison, counting people ranges from head-counts in dining facilities, to knowing the number of people who used the on-base gym on any given day. We level entire forests to produce sign in sheets for the post gym and the personnel office.

While counting people at the tactical level is a general concern of NCOs, counting things is where officers come into play. Ask any company commander to expound on the percentage of their time spent on property book inventories, and you will learn quickly the stress that counting things places on military leadership. Officers hold additional duties such as Unit Status Report (USR) officer (normally reserved for the Battalion or Brigade Chemical Officer), where counting equipment, and the readiness of vehicles in the motor pool becomes a specialized skill.

With the advent of the Defense Travel System (DTS), every service member must strictly account for every penny spent while travelling. Fortunately, DTS is easy to navigate and not open to interpretation by approving officials at every

Looking to training, a leader’s report card often depends on the number of people they train. Power Point slides presented at Quarterly Training Briefs depict the number of soldiers who qualify expert on rifle, the number who passed and failed a PT test, the number who attended SHARP training. Often, these numbers sit beside a circle colored red, yellow, or green known as the gumball chart. Numbers as a measurement of success don’t stop in garrison, they translate to how we fight our wars.

Counting things is not some garrison phenomena, soldiers count many things in combat as well, usually days. The first 100 days in a combat zone are important to a tactical unit much like the first 100 days of a presidential administration. Soldiers count the 14 days they are allowed of leave, and of course the countdown to the day when they go home throughout a 365-day deployment.  In many cases, that countdown to the end begins the day they deploy. Indeed, software such as the famous “Donut of Misery” is a direct outgrowth of this phenomenon. Moreover, most soldiers learn to subtract one day from their time starting in basic training by adding the phrase “and a wake up,” as if that final day does not count.

The Donut of Misery, often added to a staff officer or NCO's desktop on Day 1 of a deployment

Throughout the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the influence of numbers impacted nearly every commander’s update brief. Hours of electricity per day, number of wells dug, and the numbers of schools built quickly became the Global War on Terror’s version of body counts in Vietnam. The U.S. military spent thousands of man hours keeping track of the number of Iraqi Army soldier and policemen trained. Whatever that number added up to in 2011 was certainly less than the 800 or so ISIS fighters that rolled into Mosul.  Eight years of judging success by the number of security forces we manned, equipped, and trained didn’t amount to much. Indeed, according to a recent estimate the United States has killed over 50,000 ISIS fighters, which is nearly 30,000 more than the CIA’s estimated of the total number of ISIS members back in 2014. Fifty percent of the time, body counts work all the time.

Two recent and notable episodes of numbers and counting making the news was the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the 2009 surge in Afghanistan. There was little debate in the scheme of maneuver, the tactics or strategy of either operation. Rather, the debate centered on the number of boots on the ground. General Shinseki, who recommended a force of 500k was rebuked by Secretary Rumsfeld who thought the mission could be accomplished by three or four guys. (That’s not the exact number Rumsfeld insisted upon, but I was not privy to his snowflakes). The debate on the right number continues to this day, although there is a camp of thinkers who would argue that the number of troops required for the invasion of Iraq was irrelevant. We invaded a nation halfway around the world and attempted to impose western democracy on a culture most Americans don’t understand.   

General McCrystal’s surge had three courses of action, and each was based on a specific number. Indeed, military planners often develop various courses of action as a “Heavy” “Medium” or “Light” option, all based on the numbers of troops they would require.  Bob Woodward’s book Obama’s Wars chronicled the infighting that occurred in deciding what course of action to choose. But, in limiting the courses of action to specific numbers, the paradigm of operational planning changed from distinct COAs to presenting a Range of Military Options, commonly known as the ROMO (no relation to the current second string Dallas Cowboys Quarterback).

At the strategic level, counting involves much larger numbers involving force structure. For example, one number that continually arises in political discussions is the number of ships the U.S. Navy requires. Numbers range from the current status over about 220, to those who believe the Navy should expand to well over 300 ships. For those keeping count, the U.S. Navy has 11 Carrier Strike Groups, while the rest of the world combined has zero. Adversaries such as Russia and China own aircraft operate carriers with ramps, similar to those kids use with skateboards. The 11-0 shutout in Carrier Strike Groups helps me sleep at night.

On the land domain, the Army has been fighting for the right number of troops in the current era of downsizing the force. Indeed, the wartime high back in 2007 was an Army of 570k, which is on its way down to 450k. Lower numbers means lower percentage of promotion rates, which back in 2007 hovered at nearly 98%, allowing for officers with DUIs on their record to advance in rank. The percentage now teeters between 50-70%, and good people don’t make the cut. It’s a cruel reality, and makes for a good debate on Tom Ricks’s blog.

Other key way to count thing at the strategic level are the “ways” and “means.”  One of the major contributions that Washington, D.C. makes is funding things. The almighty dollar still reigns supreme. And the bigger the problem, the more money that flows its way. Arguably, inside the beltway strategy is what gets funded, and any plan or program without dollars associated with it is more a fantasy than reality. The recent Washington Post article on the Pentagon’s $125 billion in possible savings, and the Navy’s Fat Leonard corruption scandal highlight how influential money can be.   

Conclusion

Those looking to enter and serve in the United States Military should know and understand the value of math (don’t worry, little to no algebra though). We spend countless hours trying to find accurate numbers to display a measure of success in our operations. But when you read the history of Vietnam, of how small numbers of insurgents paralyzed the strategic decision making of the United States, or how the large Soviet Army failed to defeat an even smaller opponent, you realize two things. With humans at the center of warfare, Clausewitz was right when he described warfare as uncertain. Second, warfare being uncertain and defined by fog, friction, and chance; sometimes numbers don’t mean a damn thing.

War is not and will never be a wholly quantitative phenomena.  Although quantity has a quality all of its own, mass, money, and numbers are not everything.  When the budget cuts come, the force size is reduced, or the body counts start to rise, the numbers can be overwhelming, confusing, and could tempt one to dive deep into minutiae.  At these times, there is one and only one question the strategic thinker should ask themselves about the numbers…that question is “so what?”