Reviewing "A Passion for Leadership; Lessons on Change and Reform from Fifty Years of Public Service"

Following his retirement from public service, former CIA Director and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates authored two books. The first was a memoir of his time as Secretary of Defense, his second detailed the leadership lessons he learned over a lifetime of public service. In A Passion for Leadership, Gates uses his lessons learned as the Director of the CIA, President of Texas A&M, and Secretary of Defense to write about leading change in large bureaucratic organizations.

Gates focuses on a leader's ability to build teams and break down stovepipes as essential elements of strategic leadership. In building teams, Gates reflects that changing an organization may require a leader sacrifice speed of change with a gain of getting change right. Slowing down the pace allows for greater buy in of a program, as well as better-developed recommendations from all those involved. Leaders attain buy in for a program thorough more than time, they do so by breaking down organizational silos.

In important aspect of leading change, according to Gates, is the ability to break down barriers internal to an organization. In the military, this means members of various J-Codes need to work together to solve problems. Gates advocates for the stand-up of cross cutting task forces to design and implement change. With the stand-up of task forces, Gates highlights that all parts of an organization will become part of the process for proposing and implementing change. Indeed, Gates used this method at Texas A&M, the CIA, and the Department of Defense to ensure every section of each respective bureaucracy had a stake in their institutional change. For example, as head of the CIA, Gates created multiple task forces to redirect the focus of intelligence away from the Cold War mindset.

Gates also reflects on the value of investing in personal relationships to help in gaining support for change proposals. This may mean frequent meetings with academics and state legislatures while serving at a public university, or taking the time to engage with people on the hill while serving in the Pentagon or at Langley.

Most leaders understand the need to elevate high performers, and those who add value to a team. Gates takes the time to reflect on the importance of this aspect of leadership, but follows this up with techniques on removing people who obstruct progress. Gates understands that public servants at high levels operate under different laws and regulations when it comes to removing people from their positions. Further, Gates details the importance of reflecting on the positives of previous public service (some of which last a lifetime) when an individual is removed from a position. Removing or firing people in Gates’s opinion must be done with respect and care. Indeed, offering people the flexibility to resign over a period of months allows the space to find new talent while keeping a semblance of continuity for an organization.

This book is a primer for military officers who look to lead at the operational and strategic levels. Further, it serves as a guide to career and appointed leadership in government on how to lead change in large organizations. It is a fast read, and a worthwhile addition to any leader’s bookshelf.

Creativity: The Power of Off Sites

Creativity generally occurs when two disparate ideas link together to form a new concept or way of performing. Walter Isaacson, in his biography of Leonardo Da Vinci comments, “Innovation is a team sport, creativity is a collaborative endeavor.”  Over the course of my military career I have found this observation be generally true. However, I would add on an addendum, that innovation, or creativity in our day-to-day work occurs outside the office and not inside of a conference room or between

At an individual level, some of the best ideas come to light while having off-hand discussions with other service members somewhere between the hours of 1100 – 1300. Open and candid discussion between peers over Mexican food on Taco Tuesday or in the food court on a random Thursday tend to enable new ideas at almost every level. This may mean squad leaders sharing ideas on the best counseling techniques, or company commanders discussing new ways to run their company command post. Having commanded for 22 months in 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, I can attest that the best ideas I followed through with never came sitting in my office, or walking through the motorpool, they came through discussions with soldiers in the dining facility, and in discussion with my fellow commanders over

At the collective level, the best opportunities to generate creativity come from off-site events. These events can range from a staff-ride at a local Civil War Battlefield, or a staff visit to a local war museum to name just a couple. More than just the educational aspect, the ability of staff rides to build teams can shape future discussions. Members of a unit who spend time with each other at a staff ride, will then grab a coffee, or a meal together during times of intense planning, or other high stress environments. Those follow-on discussions can change the trajectory of a plan or course of action under

To quote Isaacson again, “Ideas are often generated in physical gathering places where people with diverse interests encounter one another serendipitously.” As a U.S. Army Strategist, I spend most of my hours working in a SCIF, surrounded by planners from various J-Code directorates (J2, J3, J4, etc..). While working long strenuous hours either participating in or leading operational planning teams, I have discovered the necessity of team members having discussions away from the computer screen, away from the planning cell, and away from leaders who will instantly critique their ideas. Officers who lead planning teams should keep this aspect in mind when planning during times of

A key part of running any operational planning team is time management. Operational Planning Team leaders must acknowledge that their team requires time outside of the planning cell to think and reflect on their work. OPT leaders must recognize, indeed enforce upon their planners time outside of the planning cell with other members of the OPT. This may include lunch breaks, or even breaks to grab a coffee at the post Starbucks. Rather then view this as wasted time; it is paramount to think of it as a productive endeavor. Moreover, ideas developed during a break may not come to fruition until further in the planning process. The seeds of an idea planed during a coffee break in mission analysis may grow and mature in course of action development, or be tested during wargaming. As Lost’s John Locke can attest, we often accomplish most when we work the least.

Running a Meeting

The impression a leader makes on others contributes to his success in leading them. This impression is the sum of a leader’s outward appearance, demeanor, actions, and words.

- ADRP 6-22

                 Reflecting on my 17 years of active service, there one item I wish I had learned in the military’s professional military education (PME) program. How to run a meeting. Running a meeting is a distinct skill, and should be taught to our officers and non-commissioned officers throughout their careers.

                Every officer, in nearly every position will run a meeting. Platoon sergeants, platoon leaders and company commanders run training meetings. Executive officers run staff meetings. Action officers at every level run their own internal staff meetings. Operational and strategic planners run Operational Planning Teams (OPTs). Within joint commands, every J-code runs some kind of Board, Bureau, Center, Cell, or Working Group (B2C2WG) within the command’s battle rhythm. More often than not, and for better or worse, leaders learn to run these meetings by way of mentors or self-learning.

                The Army defines three attributes of a leader within leadership doctrine (ADRP 6-22). These traits are character, intellect, and presence. The ability to run a meeting relates to the latter two. An individual may have presence in front of a formation, but can rapidly lose confidence of his or her staff when they flail through a meeting. Often, fumbling through a meeting where the outcome is nothing of consequence can deflate the morale of anyone in attendance.  

A leader’s first impression on members of his or her team can often occur at a meeting. Further, a meeting may be where an individual has their touch points with their rater and senior raters. Failing to run a meeting properly, either by having no purpose, not controlling the tempo or topics of conversations, allowing one “A type” personality to dominate discussion, or not sticking to timelines can harm a leaders reputation within a command.

                At the tactical level, Army doctrine does discuss the importance of training meetings. ADPR 7-0 refers to the training meeting as “the single most important meeting for managing training in brigades, battalions, and companies.” TC 25-30, A Leaders Guide to Training Meetings does discuss some inner working of unit training meetings, focusing on the company level. It is a useful guide for those looking to understand training meetings, but useless in the development of leadership skills required to actually run the meeting.

                On the positive side, there is some level of recognition in the joint force, that organizing meetings within a battle rhythm, each with a distinct purpose that eventually leads to flag officer touch points is paramount to a command’s success. The Joint enabling Capabilities Command (JECC), located in Norfolk Virginia hosts a knowledge management course where tools such as the 7-minute drill and skills such as battle rhythm analysis are taught. Indeed, officers skilled in assisting a command’s chief of staff to organize a battle rhythm are in high demand.

                Other options to improve a leader’s ability to run a meeting include operational planning teams is the Red Team University at Fort Leavenworth. Although the objective of the Red Team School is to promote critical thinking, and create leaders who can provide alternative analysis, the techniques taught at the course are certainly applicable to OPT leadership and overcoming toxic personalities in meetings. Further, leaders throughout the joint force should seek self-improvement in their ability to run a meeting through various business literature such as Harvard Business Review.

                Each of the services should consider adapting the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the JECC’s knowledge management enterprise. Moreover, emphasizing the skills and abilities it takes to run an efficient meeting through a NCO and officers professional military education. The joint force and services can start with distance learning through joint knowledge online (JKO), as a prerequisite prior to arriving at a command. Moreover, commanders at the tactical level should use time and resources to develop this skill in their junior leaders. Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Professional development programs should reach out to experts in the business community to teach running a meeting to junior leaders (and in many cases senior leaders). 

                Based solely on my observations over the past 22 years in the military, our educational model should adopt a method to teach leaders at all levels the science and art of running a meeting.

The Predictability of War

We have a history of hoping for the best. We hope for the best because war, of all things on this earth, is predictable.

Both Napoleon and Hitler understood that invading Russia would result in the loss of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and eventually lead to their respective downfall.  They knew and communicated this risk to the citizens of France and Nazi Germany.

We can look to obscure wars such as Russia’s war with Japan back at the turn of the twentieth century. The Tsar sent his fleet into the Pacific only after a proper net-assessment of their adversary. The Tsar knew his fleet would be destroyed, and that the war would lead to the outbreak of Japanese colonialism over the next four decades.  

As Germany, France, and Britain went to war in 1914, each nation foresaw the horrors of the Somme, and Verdun. Military planners clearly articulated the risk of invading Belgium to Kaiser Wilhelm, and the statistical probability that 750,000 German citizens would die from starvation due to the allied blockade.

Accurately predicting the outcome of war is not unique to foreign nations. When Eisenhower and Kennedy pushed advisers into Vietnam, they did so with an understanding that the conflict would turn into a war, and that an enemy so clearly outmatched in terms of technology could kill over 58,000 Americans. President Johnson and his Best and Brightest Team prepared the public for the horrors of Mai Lai. Moreover, when congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, each voting member knew how the ever-expanding war would divide the nation and have impacts on foreign and domestic policy that still resonate today.

In 2003, America went to war with the Army we had, because that is exactly the Army we needed to invade and occupy Iraq. Indeed, not only did we have the army we needed, but we wargamed against the exact enemy we would fight. I distinctly remember going to war, and receiving briefs on what would occur in places like Avu Ghraib, Yusifiyah, and Haditha.

 When, in 2011, America left Iraq, we had the understanding that a Junior Varsity Team could never conquer large swaths of territory and incite fear and violence across the globe. Thank god that never happened.

When we think about possible conflicts with North Korea, Iran, or any other nation, we should keep in mind how war always moves in unexpected directions.

Reviewing Behind the Bench

A book Review of Behind the Bench; Inside the Minds of Hockey's Greatest Coaches by Craig Custance

There is a dearth of books on hockey. At the top of any list of the greatest hockey books, Ken Drydan’s The Game is at the top of the list by 31 lengths. Hockey books that come into the discussion at number two include Jack Falla’s Home Ice and Open Ice and Wayne Coffey's The Boys of Winter. With the publication of Behind the Bench, Craig Custance puts his work into the discussion for number two on the list.

Behind the Bench is a look at the minds and methods of eleven of the best hockey coaches in the game today. More than a discussion of Xs and Os, Custance takes a unique perspective, and turns a hockey book into a leadership book, similar to what one would find in the business section of the local Barnes and Noble. Custance leadership themes that run throughout the book include the ability to manage talent, the role of luck, and the role of self-reflection, enabling leaders to engage as lifelong students of their profession.

As an Army Officer, I found many of Custance’s insights similar to what I have observed in the military (I wrote this a couple years back on how hockey prepared me for life in the military). For instance, coaches had their own theory and ways of managing talent. At the professional level, this seems to be key to success. Each coach from Dan Bylsma and Jack Sullivan who coach Sidney Crosby and Geno Malkin, to Joe Quenneville who has coached Blackhawk teams with the talent of Jonathan Toews and Patrick Kaine developed a method to motivate the greatest players in the world. Moreover, each coach had to find ways to encourage the second and third tier players in their respective championship runs.  It becomes apparent that the ability to manage talent in professional hockey relates to the ways that commanders and leaders manage men and women serving under them.

A second insight Custance brings out is the aspect of luck. Indeed, the great military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, in his seminal book On War, wrote of the effects of Fog, Friction, and Chance. Specifically, Clausewitz wrote that chance is the unpredictable circumstances that consistently occur in war. In each game, a lucky bounce of the puck or a missed call can be the difference between victory and defeat. Indeed, Coach Quenneville of the Chicago Blackhawks stated, “That’s a part nobody ever wants to talk about when winning a Stanley Cup. Luck is such a big part of it.” Chance, in war and in hockey reigns supreme.

A third insight worth mentioning is realizing that nobody has a monopoly on knowledge. Custance writes that the best ideas on advancing the game come from rookies and veterans alike.  While interviewing Mike Babcock, Coach Babcock states, “That’s how you create change. You steal ideas from CEOs. You steal ideas from other coaches. You steal ideas from the person who serves up the coffee at Tim Hortons.” The best military leaders understand this powerful philosophy. From the rank of private to four star general, everyone has something to offer.  

The book is not without its shortcomings. Custance is all over the map in his interviews and discussions with some of the coaches. Although Custance articulates the philosophy of each coach, they go back and forth between philosophies on coaching, leadership, and life. A better structure within each section could make this book even better. 

A second shortcoming is the reliance on current coaches. Although some of the great coaches such as Al Arbour and Bob Johnson have passed, an improvement on the book would have included an interview with Glen Sather, coach of the Oiler’s 1980s dynasty, or even Scotty Bowman, coach of multiple Red Wing Stanly Cup championship teams. Understanding how these men managed the likes of Wayne Gretzky, Each of these men would meet Custance’s criteria of having won either a Stanly Cup, World Championship, or Gold Medal.

Coach Melody Davidson of the 2010 Canadian Gold Medal Hockey Team

In terms of selection, Custance limited his interviews to coaches of men’s teams. Both the United States and Canada continue to field the best in women’s hockey. Ben Smith coached the USA team to a gold medal in 1998, while team Canada won on home ice in 2010 under coach Melody Davidson. At the very least including, a chapter or two on women’s coaches could lead to a wider audience.

What Custance leaves on the table is a desire for a follow-on book. His interview with John Tortorella exposes an aspect of professional coaching few people consider. Spouses and children tend to make enormous sacrifices. With Tortorella, his wife gave up a solid and well-paying professional career early in Tort’s career. This was a risk, as professional and financial success would come much later in life. Further, this success was not a sure bet. As Custance states, “John Tortorella took a job that paid him next to nothing, even when his wife had one that could have set up his young family for years.”

Family sacrifice seems to be an unexplored topic of professional coaches. Head and assistant coaching jobs typically last a few years before a team moves in another direction. A head coach and his or her family must be comfortable with uncertainty. Even at the highest levels, where salaries can mitigate the impact of these decisions, kids still make friends at school, and the constant moving from city to city takes a toll. This topic is near and dear to my heart, as it is to so many other military families who pack up and move every three to four years.

Overall, Behind the Bench is a worthwhile investment to add to any leader’s bookshelf.

Reviewing Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations

In January of 2017, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgated Joint Publication 3-0. This was approximately five months prior to the release of Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning. At a minimum, Joint Planners look to two points of doctrine, JP 30, and JP 5-0. To compliment my review of JP 5-0, here is my review of Joint Operations doctrine.

What’s Right

Few things rate as high to a staff as the commander’s intent. In previous joint doctrine, there was little direction on what a commander should include within his stated intent. The latest edition of Joint Operations mandates that commander’s intent “includes the purpose, endstate, and associated risks. While these remain a minimum of content within the commander’s intent, it is paramount for staffs and subordinate commands to have this direction to conduct planning. Further, a well-crafted intent enables a semblance of mission command, where subordinates have an ample amount of direction to operate in the chaotic conditions of combat.

Inclusion of the Electromagnetic Spectrum as a part of the “Information Environment” as well as a section on Command and Control of Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) are welcome additions. These changes are a direct result of the heavy conceptual lifting during the writing and publication of the Joint Concept for Electromagnetic Operations in 2015. This is a recognition that we must integrate EMS operations with Information Operations (IO) and cyberspace operations to account for future operations in what has been labeled “the fifth battlefield”.[i] The EMS is no longer a free-access medium. It is a battlespace where forcible entry and maneuver warfare are required to support operations in the other physical domains. By establishing the EMS as a within joint doctrine for operations, the joint force demands commanders and staffs plan for and execute spectrum operations.

Previous joint doctrine included broad discussions on Strategic Communications and their subsequent Communications Strategy. Ove the past six or seven years, there was broad pushback against this terminology. The new JP 3-0 changes to the term and definition to Commander’s Communication Synchronization (CCS). The new definition narrows the purpose of CCS, and focuses the wide array of communication forms (messages, plans, programs, products, and actions) for the commander, as directs joint commanders to synchronize their communications with other instruments of national power. This is a prudent update, but as I discuss later, should have gone further. 

Finally, the inclusion of global strike as a key consideration under joint fires (pg III-31) aligns with current practices of each combatant command. Indeed, most combatant command staffs employ global strike planners with dedicated planning resources. The discussion in JP 3-0 is short, but this mission does not occur within every joint command. It was prudent to include this discussion and recognize the need for this capability. 

Joint Strike sends a message. We should understand what message national leadership wishes to convey before we execute these types of missions

What’s Wrong

Although I praise the change from Strategic Communication to Communications Strategy, how joint staffs consider messaging in the formulations of strategy, plans, and operations remains inadequate. Indeed, most joint staffs have a couple experts working on themes and messages, which eventually translate to an Annex Y of an operations order. We need to flip this paradigm, present what message strategic leaders wish to convey to ourselves, our allies, and our adversaries, and then proceed to develop options or courses of action that align with said messages. For example, a commander’s intent could include the messages he or she wishes to send to an adversary, thus enabling his or her staff to develop multiple options in line with those messages. We all laughed at the kids majoring in communications back in college, but now as a senior officer and experienced joint planner, I realize communications is life’s most important skill. The joint force can do better in this respect.

Within joint planning, the development of options for commanders and policy makers is the best place to lead off with the intended message. Each specific option within DIME, be it in the development and execution of Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) and Flexible Response Options (FROs) relays a message to the homeland, to allies and partners, and to our enemies and adversaries. Insteadd of developing a message to corrospond to an option, or course of action, we should look to form options and courses of action to desired messages. 

Throughout the revised Joint Publication 3-0, there is discussion on phases. The new Joint Operations doctrine describes in detail multiple types of missions, from Stability Operations and DSCA to FHA, NEO, COIN, Global Strike and Large Scale Combat Operations. There are diagrams that seem to break some of these operations into phases according to the old 6-phase model. However, the revision of JP 3-0 does not label each phase. Moreover when discussing the balance of Offense, Defense, and Stability Activities, the diagram reverts to the previous 6 phases of joint operations model. The way in which JP 3-0 lays out these activities does not line up with the re-write of JP 5-0, which left out the phasing diagrams. This could create confusion for joint planners looking to reference doctrine.  

Phasing Construct Depicted in JP 3-0 (pg V=8), this is completely removed in JP 5-0             I foresee many arguments in joint planning staffs on the "proper way" to phase an operation

A well thought out Operational Approach is one of the best forms of communication from one level of command to another. When the commander and staff put time and effort into an operational approach at the onset of planning, the rest of the Joint Planning Process flows downhill. Unfortunately, the revision of JP 3-0 has one paragraph dedicated to the operational approach, with little description of its elements. An effective operations approach should include the problem statement, current conditions, Lines of Effort (LOEs) or Lines of Operation (LOOs), an endstate, along with decisive points, decision points, and possibly objectives and effects. Indeed, these elements should go into the initial operational approach, which is then updated throughout each step of the Joint Planning Process.    

Conclusion

The revision of JP 3-0 is a welcome addition to the family of joint doctrine. The updates are timely, and reflective of current practices at Combatant Commands and other joint staffs. 

[i] J. P. London, "The New Wave of Warfare -- Battling to Dominate the Electromagnetic Spectrum," Journal of Electronic Defense 38, no. 9 (09, 2015), 68-76.       

Reviewing Joint Publication 5-0

On 16 June 2017, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgated Joint Publication 5-0. This joint doctrine update was six years in the making, and reflect both lessons learned and new paradigms of planning and operating joint forces. Here are my thoughts on the latest in joint planning.

What’s Right     

The updated version of Joint Publication 5-0 has a multitude of changes that planners operating at the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Joint Task Forces, and other joint commands should understand. Some are simple, and do not require detailed discussion such as the name change from “Joint Operational Planning Process” to “Joint Planning Process.” Some of the more significant concepts in the joint planning doctrine update include the expansion on the discussion of risk, the expansion on the discussion of assessments, and the addition of an appendix on red teams. These changes and additions reflect the joint planning community’s ability to learn, reflect, and adopt some of the best practices taking place in the joint force.

Few things are as powerful to a commander as an effective Red Team. Employed properly, a Red Team will challenge the assumptions of a commander and his or her staff. Effective Red Teams do not kill the plan, rather they help the commander and staff identify weaknesses and holes in a plan, thus making said plan stronger. The discussion of Red Teams begins on Page IV-3, where there is a discussion on the role and actions of Red Teams in planning. This short discussion expands into Appendix K of Joint Publication 5-0 “Red Teams.” Within the Red Teams appendix, there is a detailed description on the role of the Red Team in each step of the Joint Planning Process. There are a limited number of dedicated Red Team personnel throughout the joint force; the Red Team Appendix recognizes this force limitation, recommending that Joint Commanders prioritize Red Team Support.

                In Chapter III, Strategy and Campaign Development, the 2017 version of JP 5-0 expands the discussion of risk. With this updated doctrine, there is a requirement for Combatant Commanders to assess strategic risk, combine it with the military or operational risk, and include an assessment of the two in Commander’s estimates and in the Annual Joint Assessment (AJA). Paramount to understanding the discussion of strategic risk is the directed timeframes. According to the 2017 version of Joint Publication 5-0 “For strategic risk, CCDRs identify the probability and consequence of near (0-2 years) and mid-term (3-7 years) strategic events or crises that could harm US national interests, and they identify the impacts of long-term (8-20 years) trends and future adversary capabilities.”  This is an astounding aspect, as historically, Combatant Commands rarely looked past the 5-year timeframe of POM[i] Cycles, leaving it to the services to think about the mid to long term future.  

                Since General McCrystal delivered the standard three courses of Action to President Obama, Combatant Commanders have been providing a menu of options for the execution of various plans. The 2017 version of Joint Publication 5-0 recognizes this aspect of planning, and formalizes that Combatant Commanders “provide multiple options to the civilian and military leadership so they can better understand how their decisions (to include timing of those decisions) can impact an operation.” Th recognition that the purpose of Joint Planning is to provide civilian leadership with military options to exercise in conjunction with other elements of national power provides clarity to what men and women working in windowless rooms sacrifice their time and energy for.

                As a plan moves from a concept and into execution, an assessment of said plan is critical. The assessment process is not new to joint planning; however, the updated doctrine on joint planning expands and updates the discussion. Indeed, similar to joint targeting, strategy, plans, operations, and assessments operate in cycles. Joint force commanders and their respective planners must understand how actions positively or negatively affect movement towards an objective or end state. Effective assessments ensure joint force commanders can adjust plans as operations unfold. The expanded discussion and emphasis on assessments is another welcome addition to our joint doctrine.

What’s Wrong

The 2017 version of Joint Publication 5-0 removes “deliberate” and “crisis action” planning terms. The theory behind this change is that both “crisis action” and “deliberate” planning use the same processes. In my opinion, this is wrong. Any planner who has spent time in a Combatant Command J35 or J5P Division can tell you that “crisis action” and “deliberate” planning both use the seven steps of JPP, but that is where the similarity ends. Historically, crisis action planning occurred within a time-constrained environment while deliberate planning took place over an extended timeframe, often spread out over the course of two years.  Moreover, in crisis action planning, various planning products from the Pinnacle OPREP 3 to the Commander’s Estimate, through publication of Execution Orders took place over the course of days and weeks.

The 6-Phase Model  Rather than limiting creativity, is brought clarity and a common language to joint planning across the plans community. 

                The constant of every Combatant Command numbered plan is the 6-phase planning model. Over the past couple decades, the 6 phases of joint operations has served as a common reference point, or terminology for joint planners. Indeed, when any planner or commander speaks about Phase III, other planners instinctively understand what part of an operation the discussion is centered on. The 2017 version of Joint Publication 5-0 maintains a detailed discussion on phasing, the purposes of phases and transition between phases to name just a few. However, this updated doctrine removes the 6-phase planning model. The removal of the 6-phase model is a mistake. This will lead to various Combatant Commands and other Joint Forces developing their own phasing construct. Doctrine provides a common language, and veering away from a common phasing model creates an unnecessary risk to the joint force.

Summary/Conclusion

                The 2017 version of Joint Publication 5-0 is a welcome and much needed update for joint planners across the force. The addition of an appendix on Red Teaming should provide a powerful tool to enhance contingency plans. Further, recognizing the difference between strategic and operational risk is paramount to get planners to look up and out, in lieu of down and in. On the downside, the elimination of the six-phase model has the potential to generate risk in coordinating and synchronizing global operations.

[i] POM: Program Objective Memoranda; the resource allocation decisions of the Military Department in response to, and in accordance with, the Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF) and Defense Planning Guidance

The Inverted Triangle of Joint Planning

For the past 18 months, my assignment with the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command enabled a different perspective on planning. On each mission, one of the products our command continually produces is an Operational Approach. The Operational approach is the culmination of operational design, and provides the commander and staff a visual of how the command visualizes the problem, along with the ways and means to achieve an endstate. While in previous assignments, the Operational Design aspect was a part of the planning, it was not stressed as an equal, or even superior product to other aspects such as Mission Analysis or Course of Action Development. I now look at Joint planning as an inverted triangle with Operational Design at the bottom, feeding the rest of the process. 

Operational design, as described in  the updated Joint Publication 5-0 is "is a methodology to aid commanders and planners in organizing and understanding the Operational Environment. Operational design contains four specific components to include understanding strategic guidance, understanding the operational environment, defining the problem, and developing an operational approach.  

Joint Publication 5-0.16 june 2017 Page IV-7

An Operational Approach, as defined by JP 5-0 is "a commander’s description of the broad actions the force can take to achieve an objective in support of the national objective or attain a military end state." It is within this product, that the commander and his/her staff can communicate how they envision the problem and the broad ways to solving the problem. The Operational Approach brings order from chaos. 

The use of operational design to build the operational approach is the aspect of joint planning where members of the staff should be in the same place. While other parts of planning such as Mission Analysis, COA Development, and Orders Development can occur within separate cubicles, every brain is necessary at the onset. No one person within a command has a monopoly in knowledge, and everyone on the staff knows something nobody else does. All this knowledge must be brought to the table at the onset of military problem solving. 

The bottom line (not up front but 4 paragraphs in) is that if the Operational Design sucks, no matter how good or thoughtful the rest of the planning process is, the final product, Operations Order, or mission will be no good, either. Indeed, planners assume the greatest risk to both the mission and to the force when they fail to consider the aspects of operational design. No matter how well conceived the mission statement at the end of Mission Analysis, or the tasks developed in COA Development, if the staff and commander are solving the wrong problem, subsequent planning and execution are fruitless endeavors, no matter how hard or long everyone works.

While the greatest risk of failure occurs at the bottom of the inverted pyramid, it is the execution of the plan that receives the most attention. It is within the execution of a Joint Operation that the greatest amount of people are acting towards an endstate. Although Clausewitzian friction is greatest in execution, if the commander has identified the right problem to solve, friction becomes easier to overcome.

Thinking of Joint Planning as an upside-down pyramid is a way to visualize where planners assume the most risk. Everything in joint planning hinges on solving the right problem, and communicating the commander's visualization of how to solve that problem to all echelons.     

Army Friendship and the Food Court Theory

               In late summer of 2012, I PCS’d  (Permanent Change of Station) from Stuttgart Germany to Williamsburg Virginia. To me, this was an ordinary move; with the exception of it was the first one with my wife and two kids. My wife did an awesome job of getting the kids and dogs ready for the move, but was quite upset that the friends she had made over the past three years would no longer be with her. My simple, albeit snarky comment was “Welcome to Army Friendships.” Naturally, she asked “what’s Army friendship?”

                Army friendship is the development of close bonds for a limited amount of time. Typically, the timeframe of an Army friendship ranges from the duration of a 2-week TDY to a 3-year permanent assignment. Army friendships end with the near complete cut off of communications, with the exception of liking a Facebook status, or commenting on a random photo posted to social media.

                My first experience of Army friendship occurred nearly 22 years ago. My friendships developed at Fort Jackson through eight weeks of basic training. My squad and more broadly my platoon developed some deep friendships, often sharing personal information normally reserved later in life for a spouse. We swore to eachother we would remain in touch, I have not heard from any of them since we walked off the parade field on graduation day. The thanks you get for feeling sorry for someone and giving them your cheese spread.

                I have developed other Army friendships over the years, to include friends in Airborne School, the Officer Basic and Advanced Course, ILE, as well as time in combat, or in the famed 101st Airborne Division. Some of these friends came to my wedding, and now we barely speak to one another. Those in the military tend to understand that this is completely normal. 

               When I think about Army friendship, my mind races to the cinematic masterpiece Stripes. Thought the comedy of Bill Murray, Harold Ramus, and John Candy, my view is that above all, the move is about friendship (strangely I have the same opinion about Ghostbusters, it’s not about fighting ghosts, it’s about friendship). If Stripes were to reflect reality on greater scale, each character would PCS and never talk to the others again.   

                The advent of social media allows us to continue Army friendships, although they are never quite the same. I find Facebook useful to link up with friends over lunch or coffee nearly everytime I am TDY. Moreover, each TDY I test my “Food Court Theory.” This theory states that if you sit in a PX food court long enough on any random day, you will see someone you know. My current job takes me TDY often, and this theory has yet to fail me. However, the impact of social media has done more than sustain friendships.

Sit here long enough and you will see someone you know

                 Social media allows soldiers, and to a greater extent men and women from all services to form friendships and connections that never would have formed twenty years ago. While this seems like an obvious statement, the impact is real and a condition the force should embrace. For instance, junior soldiers can now engage senior leaders through twitter and other on-line forums. This breaks with the traditional relationship of a specialist never speaking to a lieutenant colonel informally. The corner office barrier does not exist on twitter. Make no mistake, this is a good thing.

                Personally, social media has not only allowed me to connect with Army friends while TDY, it has forged new friendships. These new friendship have been paramount in my professional development, often creating ideas (and sometimes shooting down bad ideas), to develop and write about.

                When our time is done on this earth, our greatest moments are the time we spend with people. Parents, siblings, spouses, children, and yes Army friends. I am thankful for all I have and will know.

The American Military Hall of Fame

The American Military Hall of Fame

The greatest professional athletes reach the pinnacle of their post professional career though induction into the Hall of Fame. From Cooperstown to Canton, from Toronto to Springfield, the busts of the world’s greatest athletes are immortalized. Selection into each hall of fame is subjective, determined by a select group of men and women. Criteria ranges from statistical achievements, championships won, longevity. Conversely, factors such as a toxic personality or accusations of cheating can prevent players with the greatest statistical achievements from gaining entrance.

If the United States Military, established a hall of fame, who would gain entrance?  Who would be a part of the initial classes of inductees? What should be the location of the Hall of Fame?

First, the elgibility requirments. 1) Must have served in the American Military. 2) Must be out of the service for at least five years.

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The freshman class of the Military Hall of Fame includes Generals and Admirals responsible for the victories in America’s Major Wars. In this aspect, winning a war relates to winning championships. 

George Washington: Washington comes near Honus Wagner territory in terms of percentage of votes. Although Washington may not have the military honors of a U.S. Grant, or George Marshall, his generalship set the path for all those that would follow. For example, had Washington led the Army in the Revolution, other HoF inductees such as Grant and Pershing may have had an unremarkable military career putting down rebellions in Calcutta. Further, Washington has a brand. Easily recognizable on the One Dollar Bill, the Quarter, and Mount Rushmore, Washington built a brand more recognizable then Michael Jordan. In this aspect it is unlikely someone will replace him as the GOAT. Washington gets in with 99.7 percent of the vote, with one or two voting against due to Washington having been a slave owner.

U.S. Grant:  Grant finally saw eye to eye with President Lincoln on how the U.S. Army should fight and win the Civil War. Grant gains entrance, despite having fought in the West, which is similar to athletes today playing on the West Coast, thus receiving little media attention. Indeed, Grant’s reputation as one of the all-time greats is due to his campaigns in the East, while his victories in the West are often forgotten.

Jack Pershing: Pershing had a storied career, beginning with the Battle of Bud Bagsak during the Moro Rebellion phase of the Philippine–American War, continuing into the expedition to Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa, Pershing would then serve as Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces in the First World War. It was Pershing who ensured American soldiers were not thrust into battle to quickly, nor assimilated into the European armies. The parallel command structure was paramount to allied success. Following the war, Pershing assumed his role as Army Chief of Staff

George Marshall: The architect of World War Two. Simply put, Marshall was FDR’s indispensable general. If Washington, Grant, Pershing and are the equivalent of the best ballplayers or quarterbacks of their time, Marshall is a combination of Bill Belichick, Scotty Bowman and Phil Jackson of his era. Marshall groomed a generation of leaders below him, to include the likes of Eisenhower. One can put Marshall on the top of a “coaching tree,” in the same manner one puts Paul Brown and Vince Lombardi.

Chester Nimitz: Nimitz achieved the rank of 5-Stars, but more importantly was responsible for victory in the Battle of Midway. Midway gets Nimitz into the freshman class over other naval legends such as John Paul Jones, Admiral Dewey and Ernest King. This is similar to how Super Bowl III propelled Joe Namath into Canton.

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The Greatest of All Time

The Sophomore Class includes some of the freshman’s class subordinates. Further, with this class, some individual achievements become part of the reasoning for induction into the Hall.

William Tecumseh Sherman: The man who would conceptualize total war in his famous March to the Sea. If Grant was Babe Ruth, Sherman was Lou Gehrig. Following the war, Sherman began the Army’s Command and General Staff College. The latter achievement pushes him into the sophomore class of inductees. Sherman

Alvin York and Audie Murphy: the first NCO to enter the Military Hall of Fame. York’s induction is due to his actions where he earned the Medal of Honor. Audie Murphy was the most decorated soldier of World War II, which includes the Medal of Honor. Further, Murphy was injured 3-times in combat, and all this before his 21st birthday.  Murphy would easily earn the votes to get in.

Earning the Medal of Honor is not an automatic induction. Any Military Hall of Fame would certainly include a Medal of Honor Wing. However, just as pitching a perfect game does not make one a hall of famer neither does earning the Medal.

George Patton: A subordinate of Eisenhower in World War II, General Patton would easily make the hall of fame. Indeed, if there were such a thing as military talk radio, or a military version of Mike and Mike, some of the debate would center on Patton’s status as the GOAT. Let’s be honest, if people gambled on the outcome of battles in World War II, Patton would have never been an underdog.

Winfield Scott: General Scott’s comparison is Cal Ripken. Although not singularly responsible for for victory in America’s major wars, his tenure as Commander of the Army, his actions at Vera Cruz, his diplomatic skill as President Jacksons emissary to South Carolina during the nullification crisis, and his conceptualization of the Anaconda Plan are but a few of his notable achievements throughout the course of his stories career.

Alfred Thayer Mahan: In the late 19th Century, Mahan published his seminal work The Influence of Seapower upon History 1160-1783. His book and subsequent lectures would influence navies across the globe. Mahan gets in while Billy Mitchell of the Army Air Corps waits another year.

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The third class of inductees begins with the Revolution and brings us into the modern era

Nathaniel Greene: An underrated General who passed away shortly after the Revolution. His career is similar to Sandy Koufax, brief but dominant.   

Billy Mitchell: The father of the U.S. Air Force.  Despite his temporary ban and courts marshal, Billy Mitchell was paramount in the development of U.S. Airpower, an asymmetric advantage we hold over most of the world today.

Dwight Eisenhower: His performance as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe gain him entrance into the Hall of Fame. Further, Eisenhower was a five-star general. The five-star rank is the equivalent of hitting 500 home runs or winning 300 games. Barring a steroid era in the future where dozens of American Officers promote to General of the Army, it is a solid statistic by which to judge.

Matthew Ridgeway: Ridgeway won a championship in World War II, then made it to  game 7 in the finals in Korea.  

Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell: Lets be honest, these two men are the last GOFOs to win a championship, and when discussing the greatest of all time, championships matter. Generals of the current conflicts such as Tommy Franks have made the playoffs, but seem unable to win in the post season. 

Future inductees in no specific order

Douglas MacArthur: MacArthur will gain entry into the hall in one of his last years of eligibility. MacArthur did earn 5-Stars, was awarded the Medal of Honor, and held a host of command positions over his storied career. However, there remains a group staunchly against his entrance into the American Military Hall of Fame.

Omar Bradley Hap Arnold William Leahy Ernest King and William “Bull” Halsey: All members of the 5-Star club.  

Henry Knox, Ethan Allen and Daniel Morgan

John Paul Jones, Oliver Hazard Perry, Matthew Perry, Admiral Dewey

John Boyd

Phillip Sheridan and George Meade

Fox Conner: You can extend the “General Tree” beyond Marshall back to Fox Conner.

Chesty Puller: The most decorated Marine in U.S. history.

Hyman Rickover and Bernard Adolph Schriever make the cut for their work during the Cold War.

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Very Good but not quite in

Jimmy Doolittle: The Doolittle Raid provided a psychological boost, but like Joe DiMaggio’s 56 game hitting streak, one major accomplishment does not make a hall of fame career.

Alfred Wedemeyer and Walter Bedell Smith:  Fantastic Officers, but their major accomplishments came as lead staff officers. Dale Murphy sends his regards.

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Not Getting In

Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, and any other person who fought for the Confederacy. Much like Pete Rose, any military accomplishments have been tarnished by their decision to fight against the United States. In fact, participation in a rebellion against the United States government to preserve an economic system based on slavery is actually much worse than gambling on the outcome of baseball games. Confederates have a lifetime and beyond ban from entering the American Military Hall of Fame.

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Location

Where to put the American Military Hall of Fame can ignite debate in the same manner of who should get in. Considerations include ease of visitation and historical significance. Washington D.C. has prime real estate, but the city has multiple museums and historical sites to visit. Baltimore is close to the U.S. Naval Academy, and New York City is an epicenter of tourism.

It pains me to say it, but I would put the American Military Hall of Fame at West Point. West Point offers the history as the alma-matter of many inductees. Further, home Football games offer the perfect venue to honor new inductees.

The Location of the American Military Hall of Fame