Monday, 28 October: Virginia War Museum and Military History
To begin the week, our seminar met up in the morning at the Virginia War Museum. It is a hidden Gem adjacent to the James River, and served as a terrific forum to bring in some history into our planning. We used the museum classroom to have discussion on some previous battles and campaigns that might have some historical relevance to the problem they are planning.
JCWS uses a fictional scenario in North Africa to drive students though operational design and the joint planning process. Indeed, each seminar acts as a fictional USAFRICOM staff to build a Combatant Command Campaign Plan (CCMD), followed by the construction of a contingency plan based on tensions between fictional nations in northern Africa. As students build their fictional contingency plan, the use of history though the red team technique of analogy suitability analysis serves to expand their thinking on the problem set.
Helmet worn by then Captain Harry S. Truman in WWI
Using the Red Team technique of “Analogy Suitability Analysis,” the students examined a variety of past conflicts ranging from pre-conflict actions such as the construction of the Maginot Line, the building of China’s Belt Road, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Each student discussed what parts of past conflicts could be applied to the current planning problem they face.
As an aside, one of the best books on decision making at the strategic level is Thinking In Time, the Uses of History for Decision Makers by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May advocates for this exact technique. It prevents lazy thinking by officers, who more often than not consider themselves historians.
The nice part about holding class at an offsite is the more relaxed atmosphere of the class, and the opportunity to break bread as a group. The museum is within walking distance to The Crab Shack on the James. A TTP when taking a group of 20 to lunch, is to deliver the orders ahead of time, which avoids waiting 45 minutes for the meal to arrive at our table. We walk in, sit, eat, and walk back to the museum for some afternoon discussions and time to walk around an look at the exhibits in more detail.
Tuesday, 29 October: Command and Control, More History and the CCJO
I began the day with a two hour discussion and practical exercise focused on command and control. I presented my theory that any brief to a senior leader can encompass four topics. 1) Decisions 2) Risk 3) Authorities, and 4) Command and Control. The latter involves the first three, as the design of a C2 chart is all about decision making, risk (understanding advantages and disadvantages), and authorities, which include national caveats. All must be part of the input into the chart.
To add on to the complexities of command and control at the operational level of war, I stress the importance of coordination mechanisms. One can quickly get lost in thee acronyms, but understanding what a JACCE, SOLE, HACC, CMOC, and CCC are and provide for the commander are paramount in the construction of a C2 diagram.
What always comes up as a discussion point is how to display C2 for Marines in a JOA. First and formost, the USMC fights as its own internal combined arms team, which includes its own internal air support. It is a deadly sin to suggest a MAGTF or MEB be under operational control (OPCON) to a JTF or JFLCC commander, as OPCON allows for a commander to break up and reassign tasks to a subordinate unit. Rather, USMC units are under tactical control (TACON) to the joint force commander. Anyone looking for a fight to change this paradigm is setting themselves up for a disappointing Tank session.
Finally, I implore to the seminar to never create a C2 diagram in a vacuum. Indeed, sending off a couple planners to develop C2 in a corner, divorced from the rest of the COA development team is a recipe for disaster. Just as the concept of sustainment should be linked to the COA, so should C2. Further, differences between various C2 options could be what makes multiple courses of action distinguishable from one another.
Today, various seminar students looked at the conflict portions of past wars to include the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 2006 Lebanon War, and the Russian-German conflict, with a focus on the Russian Defense in the opening phase of Operation Barbarossa. We use the Red Team technique of Analogy Suitability Analysis to flush out how these conflicts could relate to the fictional scenario the seminar is planning against.
Lunchtime today included a guest speaker form the Joint Staff J7, who conducted an LPD (Leader Professional Development), on the design and contents of the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). It was the first of what the faculty expects to be a series of brown-bag lunch professional development opportunities. More than an overview of the CCJO, the session provided a perspective on the overall family of joint concepts, and the Chairman’s vision of future force design and development.
There are a slew of concepts out in both the joint staff and in each of the services. When teaching people the contents of a concept it is critical to keep in mind that a concept is not authoritative, and neither doctrine nor policy. Rather, it lays out ideas on how the force could operate in the future. Concepts must be tested to ensure they work, and well thought out DOTMLPF-P solutions flow from there. Anyone who remembers the absolute disaster of Effects Based Operations (EBO) understands the danger of using a concept before it is tested.
Wednesday 30 October: COA Development
The bulk of the day the seminar took time to develop their courses of action. The students divided into three OPTs, each of whom developed their own course of action. Each COA comprised of an operational sketch, a C2 chart, and a concept of sustainment. The OPTs did this for each phase of their operation. Each COA had a different focus (terrain, enemy, friendly protection), and it was neat to see the creativity each OPT used to develop their COA.
Thursday 31 October: Wargaming
The seminar chose one of their three courses of action to wargame. Their is a balance between conducting a full up wargame of every phase with every actor on the battlefield represented versus available time. Ultimately we conduct the wargame with a focus on teaching the students how to wargame, with an emphasis on the inputs and outputs of the wargame. Surprisingly, a good portion of the seminar had previous experience in this planning step, an understood the flow of events.
When we have students who are inexperienced in the wargame process, it can be a challenge to keep discussion to a minimum. A quality wargame has controlled discussions, and avoids random people offering their philosophy on how an engagement would play out.
The outputs of wargaming are critical to refining the plan. These outputs include refined CCIR, new decision points, new branch plans, and new squeals to the operation. For our seminar, this aspect opened their eyes to how skipping the wargame step can be fateful to a contingency plan.
Friday 1 November
Took a day off today to take care of family. Looking forward to writing more next week.