COVID-19 has turned the world on its head. From the perspective of a military officer, there are fundamental changes that each of the services and joint force must be ready to accept. While the immediate reactions to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 will produce a plethora of lessons learned on how to react and respond to a regional or global pandemic. However, our strategic leaders have the responsibility to lead change, and to create the future.
As of mid-March, the reaction and execution to the global pandemic should reside in current operations. Lessons learned and long-term change at the operational, strategic, and institutional levels of war need to begin now, lest the only lesson the joint force learns is to wash our hands and bump elbows instead of shaking hands.
With the understanding that there should be fundamental change, here are my thoughts on various issues, with suggestions along the DOTMLPF-P paradigm.
Issue: 2+3 Paradigm and Great Power Competition
Discussion: It is time to discard the 2+3 (what used to be 4+1) construct. COVID-19 should be the nail in the coffin for 2+3, and we should take the coffin and bury six feet in the ground. In a similar manner, COVID-19 exposed the fallacies behind the idea of great power competition. Competing in a Hobbesian world where every nation is out for themselves doesn’t lend itself to solving global problems such as a microscopic virus that doesn’t give a damn about international borders, the nature of a government, or the type of economic system a state operates on.
This should have been evident following 9/11, where the most effective counter-terror operations were a result of cooperation and coordination between allies and partners. Syria is an example of a confluence of nations and tribes all out for their own interests. Nothing gets solved.
As of this writing, hurricanes and floods have destroyed more F-22s than the combined air forces of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Worldwide, COVID-19 will kill more people than ISIS has since their emergence. Year after year, the U.S. military deploys forces in response to the damage wrought by hurricanes, wildfires, and other natural disasters.
DOTMLPF-P Recommendations
Policy: Update national level strategies that include pandemics and climate change as threats to the Homeland and American Citizens, and place these threats on the level with enemies and adversaries within the 2+3 construct.
Policy: Recognize the end of the era of great power competition, and look to a new era of great power cooperation.
Policy: Ensure Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) is recognized as a mission of the United States Military throughout all strategic documents from the National Security Strategy trough the National Defense and Military Strategies, and throughout all documents in the Joint Strategic Planning System.
The Joint Strategic Planning System (Figure from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01D, Joint Strategic Planning System, 20 July 2018)
Training: Consider development of DSCA response scenarios and training events at the combat training centers (CTCs) such as JRTC and NTC. Develop options on how combat support and combat service support units in the Active, Reserve, and National Guard components can participate in these training scenarios.
Issue: PIID branch plans for every numbered CONPLAN
Discussion: Each major combat operation contingency plan should develop a PIID branch plan. Should the United States find itself engaged in a major war on the Korean Peninsula, in Eastern Europe, or in the Middle East, the joint force should be prepared to respond to global pandemic. A pandemic in the midst of major combat operations could force the redeployment of critical capabilities required in the homeland. Indeed, an operational pause due to the loss of medical personnel and units, engineers, and other capabilities could be a decision point for strategic leaders.
Further, each service must look at the development of their own contingency plans and requisite COAs on how the institutional force can adapt to a pandemic.
DOTMLPF-P Recommendations:
Policy: Mandate PIID branches to every Contingency Plan
Policy: Mandate each service to build institutional contingency plans to respond to PIID. Plans should account for many of the contingency actions and decision points occurring today. For example, Stop Movements, Delaying PME and training schools for officers and NCOs.
Training: Develop the capability for every PME school to conduct training and education online. Each in resident PME course should have a portion of in residence courses delivered online (via Blackboard or Canvas for example). This would build the expertise in PME faculty, and ensure a smoother transition should the PIID contingency plan come into execution.
Organization: Consider more medical capabilities in the active force, as reliance on medical personnel in the reserve and National Guard reduces medical capabilities in communities in the homeland.
Issue: Social Distancing
Discussion: The joint force rapidly adjusted to the workforce operating from their residence. Most of the changes work for senior level staffs working in the Pentagon, or other higher headquarters type complex. However, the daily work schedule of an infantry squad, platoon, or company doesn’t necessarily lend itself to virtual training.
DOTMLPF-P Recommendations:
Policy: Commanders of operational and strategic level staffs should consider a remote work schedule, and develop a method to exercise the remote schedule.
Policy: Commanders and leaders across DoD should consider distributing work hours across the force. Service members and the civilian workforce should alternate hours in the same manner that unit staffs operate a battle rhythm in an operations center (e.g. a TOC or JOC).
Material: Each service should look at the feasibility of providing every service member and civilian employee the capability required to work from his or her residence. This ranges from laptops, smart phones, webcams, and software that enables group discussions (e.g. Blackboard or Canvas).
Facilities: The joint force requires a substantial upgrade in all facilities. This ranges from initial entry training barracks to the open bays service members often reside in while training.
Issue: Force Structure
Discussion: Elevating PIID and natural disasters to a threat on par with enemy and adversary nation states may require changing the way we think about what capabilities reside in the National Guard, Reserve, and Active Duty forces. Should USNORTHCOM require capabilities that are resident in the National Guard, it takes time to mobilize, and to change funding from Title 32 to Title 10.
One example is if the United States needs to surge doctors, military police, or other first responders to assist civil authorities, it may be better to have more of those capabilities in the active component. This may require a trade off with the result being more combat forces in a Title 32 role.
DOTMLPF-P Recommendations:
Organization: Consider a deep study into possible changes in what capabilities should reside in each component.
22 MARCH 2020 UPDATE
Some thoughts from a friend who is currently in command of a recruiting battalion.
Issue: Sustainment
Discussion: The joint force needs to consider branch plans in response to a crisis where the global supply of critical items are necessary for both the military and the global population. Examples include personal protective equipment (PPE), cleaning supplies, and of course, medical equipment and supplies.
The military has been operating on a “just in time” logistics system for a long time in its broader attempt to eliminate the Iron Mountain of Logistics, and to reduce the “tooth to tail ratio” of combat forces. The COVID-19 crisis is putting on the display the shortfalls of just in time.
DOTMLPF-P Recommendations:
Doctrine: Examine ways to find a balance between the Iron Mountain and Just in Time concepts of sustainment. An iron hill with a built in rationing cycle may be an option worth exploring.
Issue: Missions of Units
Discussion: During the COVID-19 crisis, multiple units in both the operational and institutional force are conducting missions not normally associated with their day-to-day or combat operations.
DOTMLPF-P Recommendations:
Doctrine/Training/Policy: Designate secondary DSCA missions to all units in all components.
Issue: Risk
Discussion: Early in the crisis, commanders at all levels were forced to make decisions on whether to accept risk to the mission, or risk to the force. As the severity of the COVID-19 crisis hit home, it became clear the protecting the force should be at the forefront. Moreover, commanders of geographically dispersed units (Recruiting for example) had to make this decision with the best available information.
DOTMLPF-P Recommendations:
Doctrine: Emphasize in doctrine the necessity to protect the force in global pandemics and other natural disasters. Preserving the men and women of the armed forces at the onset of a crisis is critical for the nation to respond to a long term crisis.
Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic can serve as a wake-up call to fundamental change across DoD, or it will be looked at as a one-off, with no real changes to how the department runs.
On a personal note, what scares the shit out of me, is the possibility that the next pandemic will flip the script on the most vulnerable. In the current atmosphere, the elderly, and those with already weak immune systems are finding themselves as victims. I cannot imagine the panic and chaos should the next pandemic strike upon the younger population, specifically children. Our nation, and the world is not prepared for that scenario.
The views in this article represent the author’s views, and not necessarily the views of the U.S. Army or Department of Defense.